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NOTES
PATRONAGE POLITICS: DEMOCRACY'S ANTIDOTE TO ENFORCED
NEUTRALITY IN CIVIL SERVICE-Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507

(1980).
INTRODUCTION
[When... all who [hold] office hold by tenure of partisan zeal and party

service ...

the certain, direct and inevitable tendency ...

is to convert

the entire body of those in office into corrupt and supple instruments of
power and to raise up a host of hungry, greedy and subservient partisans,
ready for every service, however base or corrupt.'
Despite this early warning issued by a special Senate Committee inquiring into executive patronage under Andrew Jackson,' patronage
remains a long-accepted tradition in American political life. 3
Patronage is alternately credited with "democratizing American
politics" 4 and criticized for inducing government inefficiency and cor1. SPECIAL SENATE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON EXTENT OF EXECUTIVE
PATRONAGE, S. Doc. No. 109, 23d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1835), reported in AGE OF
JACKSON, University of South Carolina Press (1972) [hereinafter cited as EXECUTIVE
PATRONAGE]. See Brief for Respondent at 11, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).

z. Democrat Andrew Jackson assumed the presidency in 1829, after a succession
of Republican administrations spanning nearly thirty years. See generally A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON (1945). Immediately, he set about dismantling the
Republican adminstrative machine that had come to regard "[office ... as a species
of property, and government ... as a means of promoting individual interests." Id. at
46 (quoting from Jackson's First Annual Message to Congress, December 1829). But

Jackson firmly believed that government was an "instrument created solely for the service of the people." Id. His doctrine of "rotation in office" was intended to narrow
the gap between the people and the government and to expand political participation.
Although the plan was an honest attempt at reform, it evolved into the "spoils
system," in which office served as a reward for political service. Those who received
the rewards exploited them as rapidly as possible before the next election when the
"spoils" would be redistributed. Id. The dispersal of patronage appointments under
Jackson was so rampant that a special Senate Committee issued a poignant warning
(quoted in introductory text) against unmoderated, partisan appointments made in
total disregard of merit. See EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE, supra note 1. If Jackson saw the
potential danger in patronage, he regarded it as a necessary antidote to the selfperpetuating bureaucracy that had preceded him. A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF
JACKSON at 47 (1945).
3. For a survey of patronage practices in American politics, see C. FISH, THE
CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE (1905); D. ROSENBLOOM, FEDERAL SERVICE AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1971); F. SORAUF, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM
(1964) [hereinafter cited as SORAUF]; and M. TOLCHIN & S. TOLCHIN, To THE VICTOR

(1972).
4. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 378 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting). By providing incentives in the forms of jobs, upward social mobility, and other rewards,
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ruption.' Reform efforts have greatly diffused the power of "professional" politicians by reducing the number of patronage appointments' and by placing most public employees within a competitive civil
service.' But a danger that overrides both the malady and the cure in
public employment practices is the burden they may impose on first
amendment rights.'
patronage broadens the base of political participation. As political activism increases,
party loyalties intensify so that diverse special interests are molded into national party
goals. In the process, party leaders acquire a new sense of accountability to the electorate. Id. at 379, cited in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting) (1980). See also SORAUF, supra note 3, at 90-91. Contra, M. WEBER, ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY (Eng. ed. 1968), construed in H. JACOBY, THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF

THE WORLD 147-48 (1973) [hereinafter cited as JACOBY]. Weber takes the view that
bureaucracy (i.e., the civil service), rather than patronage, is the democratizing
medium in politics. He finds "bureaucratization" undersirable, but inevitable:
[Bureaucratization is] undersirable because it [stands] in the way of true
democracy and the development of self-responsible, socially active citizens, and
because it [leads] to their "passive" democratization, that is, to their "levelling."
inevitable because it [is] a phenomenon characteristic of mass democracy...
It ris]
[and] has its roots in the efforts of industrial society to realize technical objectivity
and to integrate man into a mechanized system.
Id. at 147.
5. 445 U.S. at 522 n.1; 427 U.S. at 379.
6. Id.
7. In the competitive civil service, appointments and promotions are based on
merit, rather than political favoritism. For an excellent discussion of "merit" in the
various categories of public servants (elected and appointed personnel, career professionals and paraprofessionals, and blue- aid white-collar general civil service), see E.
REDFORD, DEMOCRACY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1969).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I. When a person is required to pledge allegiance to a
political party, work for or contribute to the party's candidate, or obtain the sponsorship of a particular party in order to get or to keep a job, he is likely to be coerced into
compromising his true political beliefs. This aspect of the patronage system may be an
unconstitutional infringement on first amendment rights. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel,
445 U.S. 507, 513; Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 355-56; and Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 19 (1976). On the other hand, the cost of job security free from such demands
may be unduly high. An employee in the civil service may be insulated from political
coercion and favoritism, but severe restraints may be placed on his right to be politically active. See, e.g., The Hatch Political Activity Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939);
ch. 641, 540 Stat. 767 (1940) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18 U.S.C.), upheld in
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Mitchell was affirmed 26 years
later in United States Civil Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973). See also note 36 infra. For other examples of legislative restraints on political
expression by public employees, see Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) and
Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (sustaining legislation that conditioned public
employment on signing loyalty oaths or nonmembership in certain political organizations). This line of cases focused on the right/benefit distinction in characterizing
public employment-a concept which was later repudiated. See Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972). See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597
(1972) (government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes constitutionally protected interests, especially freedom of speech); notes 50-52 and accompanying text infra.
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NOTES

Employment practices ranging from patronage appointments and
dismissals to more subtle restraints on the political activities of public
employees have been the focus of frequent judicial review. 9 In the
ongoing conflict between government interests in a loyal, efficient
work force and first amendment interets of free political expression
and affiliation, the Supreme Court has recently tightened its standard
of scrutiny."0 In 1976, in Elrod v. Burns,' 1 a divided Court found that
"a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee cannot be
discharged or threatened with discharge from a job he is satisfactorily
performing on the sole ground of his political beliefs."2 Lacking
definitive criteria for determining whether a position is "non3
policymaking" and "nonconfidential," the Court in Branti v. Finkel
refined the Elrod principle. Under the new Branti rule, the hiring
authority must demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the particular public
office." Absent such a showing, a person's continued employment
cannot be conditioned upon his allegiance to the in-party."
The impact of Branti may extend well beyond patronage
dismissals. Its language is sufficiently broad to apply to political appointments, transfers, promotions, contract awards, and other popular
forms of patronage.' 6 Carried to a logical end, Branti could so stifle
9. See, e.g., cases cited in note 8 supra and notes 37-53 infra.
10. See, e.g., Branti v. Fimkel, 445 U.S. 507 and Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347.
11. 427 U.S. 347. Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court in an
opinion joined by Justices White and Marshall. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice
Blackmun, concurred in the result. Chief Justice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion, as
did Justice Powell, who was joined by the Chief Justice and by Justice Rehnquist.
Justice Stevens did not participate. Cf. note 27 infra (alignment of Court in Branti v.
Finkel). Four years later in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), Justice Stevens wrote
for the majority and predictably opposed patronage dismissals. Justice Stevens' views
on patronage were made clear in his opinion in Illinois State Employees Council 34 v.
Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973), in which he
stated that the entire spoils system "is actually at war with the deeper traditions of
democracy embodied in the First Amendment [sic]." 473 F.2d at 576. Justice Stewart
moved from a concurring opinion in Elrod to a dissent in Branti, apparently unwilling
to abandon the policymaking-nonpolicymaking focus of Elrod.
12. 427 U.S. at 375.
13. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
14. Id. at 518.
15. Id. at 519.
16. See, e.g., Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1980) (public
employee appeals summary judgment in favor of government in employee's action
challenging reassignment and transfer for political patronage reasons). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for reconsideration in light of Branti v. Finkel, decided
only six weeks earlier, and held that the Branti principle must be construed to provide
protection against a wider range of patronage burdens than threatened or actual
dismissal. Id. at 623. In dictum the Delong court suggested that Branti'sexpanded ap-
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American principles of participatory democracy that only those persons able to prove their political neutrality would be eligible for reward
in the public service."
FACTS OF THE CASE
On January 3, 1978, Public Defender Peter Branti, newly appointed by the Democrat-dominated Rockland County Legislature,"8
issued termination notices to six of the nine assistant public defenders
who had served under his Republican predecessor. Aaron Finkel and
Alan Tabakman' 9 were among the six assistants, all Republicans,
whose employment Branti sought to terminate. 2"
The following day, Finkel and Tabakman brought action to enjoin
Branti from terminating their employment and from attempting to
alter their employment status. Relying on Elrod v. Burns," the
assistants claimed that they were nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential
government employees who were satisfactorily performing their jobs
plication should be confined to those patronage practices found to be the substantial
equivalent of dismissal. Id. at 624.
17. See generally JACOBY, supra note 4. See also notes 113-19 and accompanying
text infra.
18. Rockland County, N.Y., is governed by an eighteen member legislature
elected from each of the County's five towns in proportion to its population. The
legislature functions also as the executive in appointing department heads (including
the public defender and the county attorney), who in turn appoint assistants. There are
some fifty assistant-level appointments; nine of these are assistant public defenders
who serve[dl at the pleasure of their department head, the public defender. See Branti
v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 509.
19. Finkel and Tabakman had served as assistant public defenders since March
1971 and September 1975, respectively. Finkel was appointed under Democrat, Arnold
Becker, and continued in office under Becker's Republican successor, Frank Barone.
Barone served a full six-year term, 1972-78, and Finkel served as an assistant through
the entire period. At the time of his original appointment Finkel was a registered
Republican. In February 1977, it appeared that the next public defender would be a
Democrat. In an effort to enhance his chance of being retained under a new public
defender, Finkel filed to change his party affiliation to Democrat, effective January 1,
1978. It is clear from the record, however, that both parties continued to regard him as
Republican. Tabakman was a registered Republican at the time of his appointment in
1975, and he remains so today. Id.
20. Those assistants who were retained and the six who were to be appointed
received Branti's endorsement, but they were actually selected by Democratic
legislators or chairpersons under procedures set down by the Democratic caucus. See
note 18 supra. These procedures excluded from consideration candidates with nonDemocratic party affiliations. One possible exception was Manuel Sanchez who was retained as an assistant although he was not registered with any party. See 445 U.S. at
510 n.5. It has been suggested that Sanchez was retained because he speaks Spanish.
457 F. Supp. at 1287 n.8.
21. 427 U.S. 347.
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and that Branti's attempt to replace them on solely political grounds
violated their rights under the first and fourteenth amendments. "2
On January 4, 1978, District Judge Broderick issued a temporary
restraining order preventing Branti from terminating or attempting to
terminate, alter, change, or in any way affect the plaintiffs' employment status as of December 31, 1977. That order remained in effect
throughout the trial and was made permanent on September 29, 1978,
when the district court's decision was announced.23
The district court found that Finkel and Tabakman had been
satisfactorily performing their jobs as assistant public defenders and
were being terminated solely because of their political affiliation with
the Republican Party. Judge Broderick held that the assistant public
defenders are neither policymakers nor confidential employees, and
are therefore protected from dismissal by guarantees of the first and
fourteenth amendments. 2 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, 25 specifically holding that the district court's findings of fact
were adequately supported by the record. 26 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and affirmed.
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT

In a 6-3 decision, 27 the Court held that the first and fourteenth
amendments protect an assistant public defender who is satisfactorily
22. U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV. The first amendment includes the "freedom to
associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas....
The right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an integral part of this
basic constitutional freedom." Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973). The
fourteenth amendment provides that "no State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .... " Finkel
and Tabakman contend that the selection procedures established by the Democratic
caucus and enforced through Branti's attempt to dismiss them constitute state action
abridging their constitutional privileges under the first amendment. See also note 8
supra.
23. From January through May 1978, Branti kept Finkel and Tabakman on the
payroll, but would not let them perform their duties. Judge Broderick clarified his
order and insisted that the plaintiffs must be permitted to work as assistants and must
be paid the normal salaries for their positions. He reiterated that the constitutional
right being upheld by the order was the right not to be dismissed from public employment upon the sole basis of one's political beliefs. 445 U.S. at 509 n.3 (citing 457 F.
Supp. at 1285-86 n.4). See also Brief of Respondent at 5, 445 U.S. 507.
24. 457 F. Supp. at 1285.
25. Finkel v. Branti, 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979) (unpublished memorandum
opinion).
26. 445 U.S. at 511 (citing unpublished memorandum opinion of the Second Circuit for Finkel v. Branti).
27. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined. Justice Stewart
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performing his job from being discharged solely on the basis of his
political association.28 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens framed
the ultimate inquiry in Branti as "whether the hiring authority can
demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the
effective performance of the public office involved." 29
The Branti decision encompassed two underlying determinations.
First, the Court held that government employees are not required to
prove that they, or other employees, have been coerced into changing
their political allegiance.3 In Branti, it was sufficient for Finkel and
Tabakman to show that they were about to be discharged solely
because they were not affiliated with or sponsored by the Democratic
Party. 3 Second, the test enunciated in Branti substantially modified
the Elrod focus on "nonpolicymaking-nonconfidentiality," 3 2 emphasizing instead the relevance of party affiliation to the efficient
discharge of the employee's governmental responsibilities." Applying
this modified test to the facts of Branti, the Court concluded that "the
continued employment of an assistant public defender cannot properly
be conditioned upon his allegiance to the political party in control of
the county government." 3 '
ANALYSIS

To understand how respondents, Aaron Finkel and Alan
Tabakman, enjoyed constitutional protection against being discharged
from their positions as assistant public defenders for solely political
reasons, it is necessary to address several preliminary issues.
First, it is important to trace the historical development of first
amendment rights in public employment, culminating in the Elrod test.
Second, the Branti decision itself involves two inquiries: 1) How
much political coercion will be tolerated in the public service? 2) Of
what relevance is party affiliation to the effective performance of the
particular public office involved?'The Branti Court places the burden
of answering this latter question squarely on the hiring authority and
thus reinforces a presumption in favor of continued public employment.
filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Powell filed a separate dissent in which Justice Rehnquist joined and in Part I of which Justice Stewart joined. 445 U.S. at 508. Cf.note 11
supra (alignment of Court in Elrod).
28. 445 U.S. at 507 syl., 513-20.
29. Id.at 518.
30. Id.at 517.
31. Id.at 517 (citing 427 U.S. at 350).

32.
33.
34.

Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 518.
Id.at 518-19.
Id.at 519.
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Finally, it is important to consider how the new Branti rule may
impact on other patronage practices including political appointments,
transfers, promotions, and contract awards. If Branti means the end of
patronage in American politics, it could also mean the blanket imposition of political neutrality in all levels of public service. As the political
activity of the individual public employee is neutralized, his involvement and his stake in the political system wanes. When this happens
across the board in the public service, the resulting system bears little
resemblance to a participatory democracy.
A.

First Amendment Rights in Public Employment-Historical
Development

Patronage requirements and other restrictions on the political activities of public employees have not always enjoyed the Court's strict
scrutiny. In fact, the Supreme Court has a long history of upholding
federal and state legislation aimed at civil service reform and curbing
patronage abuses," even though such decisions have subordinated
employees' first amendment rights to government interests in a loyal,
efficient work force. In 1947, for example, the Court considered the

36
constitutionality of the Hatch Act in United Public Workers v. Mit35. The first civil service reform legislation was the Pendleton Act. Act of
January 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403. The Pendleton Act was directed at entry into
federal service rather than promotion or termination, but it did prohibit removal of an
employee for failure to work for or contribute to a political party. In 1897, Civil Service Rule II was passed, § 8 of which provided that federal employees could not be
removed "except for just cause" (emphasis added). When this was translated into the
Lloyd-LaFollette Act in 1913, the language was changed to prohibit removal "except
for such cause as will promote the efficiency of said service" (emphasis added). An interesting shift had occurred between 1897 and 1913 in that the government's interest in
"justice" in the civil service had been surpassed by the government's interest in "efficiency." The Lloyd-LaFollette Act is now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7501 et seq. The
Statement of Purpose of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS, 2739-40, states that "the merit system principles ... shall govern."
This Act is credited as being the most comprehensive approach to civil service reform
since the Pendleton Act. Farkas v. Thornburgh, 493 F. Supp. 1168, 1170-71 n.9 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).
36. The Hatch Political Activity Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939); ch. 640, 54
Stat. 767 (1940) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18 U.S.C.). The Hatch Political
Activity Act has been amended several times since its original enactment in 1939. See
Vaughn, Restrictions on the PoliticalActivities of Public Employees: The Hatch Act
and Beyond, 44 GEORGE WASHINGTON L. REV. 516 (1976).
The federal bureaucracy grew in both size and influence between 1883, when
the Pendleton Act was enacted, and 1939, when the Hatch Act was enacted.
Federal positions had multiplied. . . . Many . . . positions were outside the
classified service and outside the reach of the civil service political neutrality rule.
Congress feared the development of a partisan political machine run with federal
employees. That fear, combined with hostility toward the administration and the
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chell."'The plaintiff in Mitchell challenged in particular section 9(a) of
the Act, which prohibited federal civil servants from taking "any active part in political management or in political campaigns." 38 The
Court upheld the legislation and concluded that such restraints were
necessary to insulate civil servants of every rank and function from
political coercion or favoritism. 39 In the words of the Mitchell Court:
Congress recognizes danger to the [civil] service in that political rather
than official effort may earn advancement.... Congress and the President are responsible for an efficient public service. If, in their judgment,
efficiency may be best obtained by prohibiting active participation by
classified employees . . .we see no constitutional objection. 0

A few years later, in Adler v. Board of Education,"' the Court ruled
that restraints that were reasonably related to a legitimate government
end were constitutionally permissible.' 2 In 1952, the Adler Court
upheld a New York State civil service law prohibiting public school
employees from belonging to organizations advocating the overthrow
bureaucracy, stimulated Congress ... to adopt legislation ... that incorporated
the civil service neutrality rule and expanded coverage of political restrictions to
both classified and nonclassified employees.
Id. at 518. In 1940, Congress extended Hatch Act coverage to state and local
employees principally employed in positions financed by the federal government. As
amended, the Act restricts partisan political activity of government employees in two
ways: it prohibits the use of official authority or influence to interfere with an election;
and it bars employees from taking an active part in political management or in political
campaigns. For an excellent discussion of the pros and cons of proposed revisions to
the Hatch Act see AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSES, HATCH

ACT REVISION (1978). Those supporting revision of the Act claim that it "is ambiguously worded and overbroad in scope, infringing upon First Amendment [sic]
freedoms without compelling reason; that it bears little reference to current political
conditions; and that it is not supported by the American public or by federal
employees themselves." Id. at 11. In general, those opposing revision of the Act "emphasize the need to guard against politicization of the bureaucracy .... They maintain
that without its protection, both the bureaucracy and the public would be made
vulnerable to' political coercion." Id.at 15.
37. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 61h (Supp. V 1940). The plaintiff was employed as a roller in a
United States mint and served as a Democratic Ward Executive Committeeman in
Philadelphia.
39. 330 U.S. at 98-99. Mitchell was affirmed in United States Civil Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). Justice Douglas dissented in Mitchell and in Letter Carriers, despite the majority's attempt to justify such "imposed
political neutrality." Id.at 562-67. Justice Douglas insisted that where first amendment freedoms were at stake, no employment could be conditioned on their surrender.
Id.at 596-97 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
40. 330 U.S. at 98-99.
41. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
42. Id.at 494-95.
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of the United States government.' 3 Later that same year, however, the
Court in Wiemann v. Updegraff" recognized that restrictions on mere
membership may be overly broad and may proscribe membership that
is totally innocent." The Wiemann Court ruled that a state could not
require its employees to sign loyalty oaths denying past affiliation with
Communists.' In 1967, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 47 the Court
laid out a test permitting membership restrictions only with proof of
the employee's intent to further the goals of a particular subversive
organization.",

Thus by the time of Keyishian, the Court had become less permissive of restrictions on the political activities of public employees.
First amendment guarantees included "the freedom to associate with
others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas...
[and] the right to associate with the political party of one's choice [was
''
basic constitutional
ofv.this
integral
recognized]
° pointed freedom.
out that: 14
Sindermann
in part
Perry
In 1972, astheanCourt
[f]or at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even
though a person has no "right" to a valuable public benefit [i.e., public
employment] and even though the government may deny him the benefit
for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the
government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially his interest in
freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or association, his
exercise of those freedoms would be penalized and inhibited .... Such
interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.3 '
In Perry, the Court acknowledged that the first amendment protects a
43.

Id.

44. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
45. Id.at 191.
46. Id.
47. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
48.

Id.

49. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973) (recognizing employee's right to
change political parties). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); and Keyishian v. Board of Educ., 385 U.S. 589
(1967).
50. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
51. Id.at 597. The right/benefit distinction referred to in Perry grew out of
Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950) aff'd per curiam by an equally

divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). Bailey rejected the notion that public employment
was a right based on fourteenth amendment "liberty" or "property" interests. This
right/ benefit distinction was later repudiated in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 571 (1972) and in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
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public employee from discharge based on his exercise of free political
expression or association. Such constitutional protection is rarely absolute, but the strictest judical scrutiny will be required before such
protection is forfeited to a compelling state interest."2 Four years later
this standard was applied in Elrod v. Burns,"3 in a case challenging the
constitutionality of patronage dismissals.
B.

The Elrod Test

In 1976, a divided Supreme Court5" found that the discharge or
threatened discharge of non-civil service employees of the Cook County,
Illinois Sheriff's Office, solely because they had failed to affiliate with
:r obtain the sponsorship of the Democratic Party, constituted an un-onstitutional infringement of their first amendment rights. 5
The Elrod plurality outlined the following test:
[Ihf conditioning the retention of public employment on the employee's
support of the in-party is to survive constitutional challenge, it must further some vital governmental end by a means that is least restrictive of

freedom of belief and association in achieving that end, and the benefit
gained must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected rights.

6

Several governmental interests were proffered to justify patronage
dismissals: the need for an efficient and unified work force; the need
to preserve the democratic process; and the need to insure that policies
sanctioned by the electorate are effectively implemented. None of these
interests were found sufficiently compelling to justify across the board
patronage dismissals as the least restrictive means of achieving that
end. The Court said that unity and efficiency in the work force could
best be insured through the merit system and through case by case
review. The Court was not convinced that cessation of patronage
dismissals would have a negative impact on partisan politics and the
democratic process. Finally, the Court felt that policy implementation
could be fully protected by limiting patronage dismissals to policymaking positions, since nonpolicymaking employees would not be in a
position to thwart the goals of a new administration. 7 Therefore, the
Elrod plurality concluded that the government's interest in the effective implementation of policies newly endorsed by the electorate was
52. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 516; Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. at 368 &
362; and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 at 94.

53. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
54. See note 11 supra.
55.

Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. at 373.

56.
57.

Id. at 563-64 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
Id. at 364-73.
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sufficiently compelling to justify the dismissal of policymaking
employees on solely political grounds."'
Writing for the plurality, Justice Brennan pointed out that there is
no clear line between policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions."
He did, however, suggest several criteria to aid in such a determination. The recommended guidelines focus on the nature and extent of
the employee's responsibilities and his role in formulating and/or implementing broad goals." ° The broader or less defined an employee's
responsibilities, and the more involved he is in decision-making and
goal-setting, the more likely he is a policymaker."
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart viewed the issue to be
"whether a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee
can be discharged or threatened with discharge from a job that he is
satisfactorily performing upon the sole ground of his political
beliefs.""" The dual criteria of "nonpolicymaking-nonconfidentiality"'' emerged as the test for those government positions entitled to
Elrod protection against discharge for solely political reasons."
The Elrod test is generally applied in two stages. First, it must be
determined whether a particular employee was selected for termination
for solely political reasons. If there were other substantial, nonpolitical
reasons for the action, there may be no constitutional infringement."
Second, if it is established that the discharge was substantially
politically motivated, then it must be determined whether the employee
falls within the Elrod protection. That is, is he the type of non58. Id. at 372.
59.
60.

61.
62.
63.
court in

Id. at 367.
Id. at 367-68.

Id.
Id. at 375.
There is little case law on the concept of "confidentiality," but the district
Brand surmised that it is ancillary to "policymaking." 457 F. Supp. at 1291.

See also note 76 infra.

64. Most courts relying on Elrod read the concurrence as constituting the rule of
the case because, when the Court is so divided, "the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds." Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). See also Ramey v. Harber, 431 F. Supp. 657,
662 (W.D. Va. 1977) (Elrod read in accordance with "least common denominator"
test of Marks and Gregg). Cf. Fimkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 n.9 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (supporting broader reading of Elrod than that dictated by 'least common
denominator" test), qffW, 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). For
a discussion of the application of the Elrod test in Branti, see note 76 infra.
65. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (plaintiff
cannot use a constitutional privilege to prevent termination for nonconstitutionally
protected activity). In this Mt. Healthy "same decision anyway" defense, the governmat must show by a preponderance that discharge is justified on other grounds.
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policymaking, nonconfidential employee who may not be discharged
66
or threatened with discharge for solely political reasons?
C.

The Brani Decision
1.

How Much Coercion Is Too Much?

Elrod had identified two reasons supporting the conclusion that
patronage dismissals are prohibited by the first and fourteenth amendments. First, the inevitable tendency of such a system is to coerce
employees into compromising their true beliefs."" Second, absent a
showing of some overriding state interest, patronage practices impose
an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit.6
In Branti v. Finkel, petitioner Branti argued that Elrod does not
apply to requirements of in-party sponsorship, but is limited to situations in which government employees are actually coerced into pledging allegiance to a political party that they would not support-voluntarily. Therefore, he contended, Elrod prohibits only those dismissals
resulting from an employee's failure to capitulate to political coercion.
Attempting to distinguish the instant case, he claimed that respondents
were never asked to change their political affiliation or contribute to or
work for the party's candidates. Since, however, party sponsorship
was a requirement for the position of assistant public defender, and
since neither Finkel nor Tabakman met that requirement, they were
being replaced by persons who did. 69
66. Lower federal courts have applied this test with varying results. See, e.g.,
Loughney v. Hickey, 480 F. Supp. 1352 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (Superintendents of
Highways and Refuse who take active part in policymaking and who are privy to
discussion and information involved in policymaking process are policymaking, confidential municipal employees who may be discharged for solely political reasons);
Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977)
(Deputy City Attorney's dismissal on announcing intent to run for Congress upheld
since plaintiff's duties were of broad scope which the Elrod Court equated with a
policymaking function); Ramey v. Harber, 431 F. Supp. 657, 666 n.15 (W.D. Va.
1977) (policymaker defined as one who controls or exercises a role in the decision making process as to the goals and general operating procedures of the office; e.g., decision to make a specific arrest is nonpolicymaking, while decision to concentrate on certain types of crimes is policymaking).
67. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 513-14 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. at
355-56).
68. Branti v. Fmkel, 445 U.S. at 514-17 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. at
357-58, 362, & 368). See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
69. 445 U.S. at 512. Respondents, Finkel and Tabakman, noted in Brief that
more overt forms of coercion would have been less of a constitutional burden and,
therefore, preferable. That is, where changing one's political allegiance or contributing to or working on behalf of a particular candidate makes a difference, at least the
government employee has the option of submitting to such coercion to keep his job or
exercising his freedom of expression and being discharged.
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Justice Stevens found that this perspective would "emasculate the
principles set forth in Elrod."' ° While such a view may eliminate the
more blatant forms of coercion, "it would not eliminate the coercion
of belief that necessarily flows from the knowledge that one must have
a sponsor in the dominant party in order to retain one's job.""
Although there was no "overt political pressure" exerted on the
respondents in this case, Justice Stevens pointed to Mr. Finkel's
change of party registration, in an effort to retain his position, as an
example of the potentially coercive effect of requiring party sponsorship.72 He concluded that, to prevail in this type of action, it is not
necessary to prove that employees have been actually or ostensibly
coerced into changing their political allegiance. 3 It is sufficient to
show that they were about to be discharged "solely for the reason that
they were not affiliated with or sponsored by the . . . [dominant]
7
party." '
2.

The Branti Modification

The district court framed the issue in the instant case as whether
Finkel and Tabakman are nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employees who, solely for political reasons, were threatened with
removal from jobs they were competent to perform and had been
satisfactorily performing. 7 5 Judge Broderick meticulously applied the
principles of Elrod and its progeny to Branti and concluded that assistant public defenders are nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential
employees." He also concluded that Finkel and Tabakman had been
70. 445 U.S. at 516.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 516 n.ll. See note 19 supra.
445 U.S. at 517.
Id. (quoting 427 U.S. at 350).
457 F. Supp. at 1285.

76. See note 66 supra for cases discussing the policymaking requirement. Applied
to the facts in Brant v. Finkel, the district court found that the responsibilities of assistant public defenders with respect to their specific cases are not well-defined. With
respect to the operation of the public defender's office, however, they have limited, if
any, responsibility. Furthermore, they do not act as advisors or formulate plans for the
implementation of broad office goals. Although they do make decisions in the context
of specific cases, they do not make decisions about the orientation and operation of
the office in which they work. 457 F. Supp. at 1291. The district court found little case

law on the concept of confidentiality, but determined that it is ancillary to the concept of policymaking. "An employee is a confidential employee if he or she stands in a
confidential relation to the policymaking process, e.g., as an advisor to a policymaker,
or if he or she has access to confidential documents or other materials that embody
policymaking deliberations and determinations. . . ." 457 F. Supp. at 1291. Judge

Broderick noted that assistant public defenders stand in a confidential relationship to
the public defender as an attorney, but not as a policymaker. Id.
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satisfactorily performing their jobs and that the attempt to remove
them was based solely on their political beliefs." Having ruled that
plaintiffs were entitled to the injunctive relief they sought, Judge
Broderick then raised an issue that formed the basis of the Supreme
Court's Branti modification of the Elrod test. In footnote, Judge
Broderick questioned the "propriety of political considerations entering into the selection of attorneys to serve in the sensitive positions of
Assistant Public Defenders."" 8 He asked:
By what rationale can it even be suggested that it is legitimate to consider
in the selection process, the politics of one who is to represent indigent
defendants accused of crime? No "compelling state interest" can be served
by insisting that those who represent such defendants publicly profess to
be Democrats (or Republicans)."
Judge Broderick aptly reminds us that first amendment guarantees
will be surrendered only on the showing of a "compelling state
interest." Indeed, the original strict scrutiny test outlined by the Elrod
plurality called for the "least restrictive" means of furthering a "vital
government end."80 Justice Brennan proceeded to apply this test to the
facts of Elrod and determined that none of the suggested governmental
interests were sufficiently "vital" to justify the discharge of nonpolicymaking employees for solely political reasons. This conclusion
was repeated by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion. Courts that
have read the concurrence as the law of Elrod have cut short their
analysis before addressing important issues and have fallen victim to
mechanical decisions made possible by their shortcut." What is
overlooked in such decisions is that compelling governmental interests
change as do the preferred means for realizing those interests.
The Supreme Court in Branti reconsidered the nonpolicymakingnonconfidentiality criteria generally taken as the rule of Elrod, and offered numerous examples of how the rule has failed. Justice Stevens
pointed to some positions in which party affiliation may be an appropriate consideration even though that position is neither policymaking nor confidential. For example, state election laws may require that
precincts be supervised by two election judges of different parties.
Although this job is neither confidential nor policymaking, party
membership is essential to the performance of this particular position.
77. Id.at 1292-93.
78. Id.at 1293 n.13.
79. Id.
80.

81.

427 U.S. at 373.

See, e.g., note 66supra and cases cited therein.
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Similarly, there are many policymaking, confidential positions in
which party affiliation is irrelevant-for example, a state university
football coach. Clearly, these criteria are inadequate, the greatest
danger lying in their failure to provide first amendment protection to
many of those who may need it most.' 2
With this potential overbreadth and underbreadth in mind, Justice
Stevens restated the ultimate question in Branti as "whether the hiring
authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office
involved." 3 He then analyzed the office of assistant public defender in
light of this modified test and pointed out that the primary responsibility of an assistant public defender is to represent indigent citizens
in controversies with the state. Any policymaking involved in such a
function relates to the individual cases being tried, not to partisan
political concerns. There is a certain amount of confidentiality in the
various attorney-client relationships an assistant public defender
develops, but these are not of political concern. Therefore, the Court
concluded, to make the tenure of an assistant public defender "dependent on his allegiance to the dominant political party ...would undermine, rather than promote, the effective performance of [his]
office."'

Even Justice Stevens' restatement of the issue in patronage
dismissals fails to spell out the "vital government end" to be achieved.
Perhaps "effective performance of the public office" could be read as
a compelling state interest. If so, it should be noted that this is not the
same compelling interest sought in Elrod. Recall that Justice Brennan
considered the "need to insure effective government and the efficiency
of public employees"" ' as a justification for patronage and concluded
that this end could be better insured through the merit system and
case by case review.' Recall, too, that the only government interest
Justice Brennan found sufficiently compelling to justify even limited
first amendment infringements (through patronage dismissals) is the
need to protect the representative form of government, that is, to insure that policies presumably sanctioned by the electorate are ef7
fectively implemented.'
82.

445 U.S. at 518.

83. Id.
84. Id. at 519-20.
85. 427 U.S. at 367. Compare this shift in stated interests to the shift from
"justice" to "efficiency" noted between the Pendleton Act and the Lloyd-LaFollette
Act, supra note 35.
86. 427 U.S. at 367-68.
87. Id. at 367.
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Burdens and Presumptions Under Branti

An offshoot of the Branti rule is that the hiring authority has the
burden of demonstrating that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the particular public
office. 8 Absent such a showing, a person's continued employment
cannot be conditioned upon his allegiance to, or sponsorship by, the
in-party." This would seem to reinforce a presumption in favor of
continued public employment since an employment term no longer expires automatically on the election of a new party. It may be useful to
review the burdens imposed under the various tests applied to
patronage dismissals to determine whether a similar presumption
prevails.
Elrod required a showing that an employee was selected for termination for solely political reasons. 9" This requirement has been overcome in later cases"' by the Mt. Healthy "same decision anyway''92
defense showing that the same decision to terminate would have been
reached based on the employee's nonconstitutionally protected activity. As a defense, the burden is on the government to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that a particular discharge is justified
on nonpolitical grounds. 3 The Elrod concurrence added the requirement of satisfactory performance," but did not elucidate on its application. Presumably, if the employee were not satisfactorily performing his duties, the government could use evidence of his unsatisfactory
performance in the Mt. Healthy "same decision anyway" defense.
Judge Broderick framed a slightly different test in the district court
in Branti: Nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employees
cannot be threatened with removal, for solely political reasons, from
jobs they are competent to perform and have been satisfactorily performing." This test makes explicit a requirement for continued
employment in patronage positions that had been previously
unstated--competent performance. Stated in the affirmative, and in
addition to the requirements of satisfactory performance and solely
88. 445 U.S. at 518.
89. Id. at 519.
90. 427 U.S. at 375.
91. See, e.g., Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979);
Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (plaintiff cannot use a

constitutional privilege to prevent termination for nonconstitutionally protected activity).
92. 429 U.S. 274.
93. Id.
94.
95.

427 U.S. at 375.
457 F. Supp. at 1285.
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political reasons (for discharge), it seems to put the burden on the
plaintiff employee to establish that he is competent to perform his job
and has been satisfactorily performing it.
The facts in Branti did not put the questions of satisfactory or
competent performance in issue."' Had the circumstances been otherwise, how would the government's burden of justifying discharge on
nonpolitical grounds offset plaintiff's burden of showing competent,
satisfactory performance? Emphasis on this issue could go far toward
alleviating much of the inefficiency and corruption associated with
patronage practices97 by making appointees accountable for job performance beyond their immediate supervisors and by making department heads and elected officials authorizing the appointments more
cautious as to the competence of their appointees.
Branti did address the question of a presumption of continued
employment. Petitioner Branti claimed that the term of an assistant
public defender automatically expires with the term of the public
defender. Therefore, he argued, the action taken in this case should be
treated as a failure to reappoint, rather than a dismissal or threat of
dismissal and should be subject to a less strict standard of review.9 8
Respondents disagreed with this view of the term of assistant public
defenders. They claimed that their offices do not become vacant on the
appointment of a new public defender. Rather, they are "removable"
by the new public defender, presumably on the showing of some
99
cause.
Branti also argued that since Finkel and Tabakman knew these
were patronage positions when they were hired, they did not have a
reasonable expectation of reappointment once control of the party
shifted to the opposing party.'0 0 This perspective is reminiscent of two
lines of reasoning: the waiver theory and the objective/subjective expectancy of continued employment.
96. Id. at 1292 n.ll. At the original hearing on the injunction sought by Finkel
and Tabakman, Branti rated them both as "competent attorneys." Judge Broderick
chose to ignore Branti's later testimony contradicting this rating, finding it "apparently structured to meet the perceived needs of the litigation as it developed." Id.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court's findings of fact
regarding the plaintiff's competence.
97. See 445 U.S. at 522 n.1 and 427 U.S. at 379.
98. 445 U.S. at 512 n.6.
99. Brief for Respondent at 8-9, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). The district court determined that "removability" by the public defender is irrelevant to the constitutional
issues presented in this case 457 F. Supp. 1292 n.10 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 597; Rivera Morales v. Benitz de Rexach, 541 F.2d 882, 885 (1st Cir. 1976)).
100. 445 U.S. at 512 n.6.
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According to the waiver theory, an employee waives any right to
object to a dismissal (or nonreappointment) by taking a patronage
position in the first place. Justice Brennan disposes of the waiver claim
in footnote, pointing out that the Court rejected a similar argument in
Elrod.'io After Elrod, it was clear that lack of a reasonable expectancy
of continued employment is not sufficient to justify a dismissal based
solely on an employee's private political belief or affiliation.' 2
.Justice Powell is more sympathetic to the waiver view. In his
dissenting opinion in Branti he reminds the Court of a suggestion he
made in Elrod, also in dissent. Public employees who lose positions
that they obtained through their participation in the patronage system
have not lost first amendment rights. "Such employees have assumed
the risks of the system and were benefited, not penalized, by its prac0 3
tical operation."1
Respondents claim that they had a reasonable expectancy of reappointment under the new public defender. Finkel pointed out that he
had been appointed under a Democratic public defender and had been
retained for the full six-year term of the Republican successor. 10 In
making this argument, respondents rely heavily on gloss from Perry v.
Sindermann, 0'° where the Supreme Court said that subjective expectancy of continued employment is not protected by due process.'",
From this it may follow that objective expectancy of reemployment
does have constitutional protection.1 0' If, indeed, this can be taken as
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 427 U.S. at 380-81 (Powell, J., dissenting) cited in 445 U.S. at 526 n.6.
104. 457 F. Supp. at 1286.
105. 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
106. Id.
107. Recall Perry's admonition that government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests ....
This would
allow the government to 'produce a result which [it] could not command directly' [citation omitted]." 408 U.S. at 597. Dismissal or threat of dismissal for patronage reasons
is "the ultimate means of achieving by indirection the impermissible result of a direct
command to a government to cease exercising protected rights of free political association and speech." Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618, 623 (1980). The Delong court
suggested that this principle could also be applied to patronage practices found to be
the substantial equivalent of dismissal, such as certain reassignments and transfers.
Delong then provides guidelines for determining whether a specific reassignment or
transfer is tantamount to outright dismissal. A number of subjective and objective factors pertaining to the employee's expectations and reliance upon continued employment emerged as critical to this factual determination. Delong concluded that the
employee's reasonable expectations and reliance should be weighed, along with the
likelihood of reassignment and transfer in comparable employment in the private sector, and only those subjective expectations and reliance on the employee's part that
were actually or constructively known to the official making or threatening the transfer
or reassignment. Note that the ultimate issue being addressed by these factors is
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a corollary to the rule of Perry v. Sindermann, the factual issues remain of whether, under the circumstances, any expectation of continued employment exists, and, if so, whether that expectation is
reasonable. "°
Recall that the Branti rule places the burden of showing that party
affiliation is a legitimate consideration for a particular government
position on the hiring authority. It would appear that such a determination would be most appropriate at the time the particular position
is created and prior to the first appointment. Thus a person could
know going into a position that it is a patronage position and that party
affiliation is a requirement for the effective performance of the office.
This would revive Justice Powell's waiver theory under which persons
voluntarily accepting patronage positions waive their right to object to
a politically motivated dismissal.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The Supreme Court in Branti held that the first and fourteenth
amendments protect public employees from discharge solely because of
their political beliefs. This decision substantially modifies prior case
law regarding patronage dismissals in two ways: 1) It is not necessary
to prove that employees have been actually or ostensibly coerced into
changing their political allegiance. It is sufficient to show that they
were about to be discharged solely for the reason that they were not affiliated with or sponsored by the dominant party. 2) The issue is not
whether the particular public office involved is policymaking or confidential; but whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance
of the office.
Justice Powell noted in his Branti dissent" 9 that "a strength of our
system has been the blend of civil service and patronage appointments
subject always to oversight and change by the legislative branch of
government."'" 1 The importance of maintaining this precarious
balance was noted by Max Weber during a visit to the United States in
whether, all things considered, the challenged reassignment or transfer can reasonably
be thought to have imposed so unfair. a choice between continued employment and the
exercise of protected beliefs and associations as to be tantamount to the choice imposed by threatened dismissal. When these same factors are weighed against compelling government interests in conventional patronage employment practices it may
follow that an employee's objective expectancy of continued employment in the public

service is protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 624.
108. See note 107 supra.
109. 445 U.S. at 525 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting).

110. Id.
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1904. 1" Weber was struck by a viewpoint expressed by an American
worker he encountered who found "corrupt politicians who can be
removed from office were preferable to a permanent, specialized
bureaucracy."" ' 2 Weber restated the dilemma as a "political spoils
system with corruption, waste of public revenues, and lack of administrative technology in conflict with democratic tendencies.""' 3
Paradoxically, he noted, "the reformers found themselves advocating
11 4
a bureaucratic structure which politically they rejected."
The balance between patronage positions and a merit-based civil
service must be maintained to insure an efficient work force that is
ideologically compatible with American principles of participatory
democracy. If public employees are allowed and required to be
apolitical, with the exception of elected officials and a handful of
political appointees, how participatory or democratic can the system
remain? II
This paradox is summarized in the following caveat:
[I]t is possible that the public service, because of a self-imposed commitment to the interests of the general public, begins to see rational behavior
as contradictory to party politics, and finally takes an exaggeratedly
neutral stance. This is revealed by its indifference to constitutional principles, disregard for party feuds, insensitivity toward any change in
political leadership, and the arrogance with which it relies on its own
judgment. Indeed, when the ship founders on the sands, the bureaucracy
might even convince itself of the necessity of placing itself at the political
wheel as a "nonpartisan" solution. The principle of neutrality among
competing interest groups can be exaggerated to the point of selfcancellation, so that seemingly the official is not committed to anything
except the ingenious defense of his public status."'
Mary Ann Thinnes
111. M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Eng. ed. 1968), construed in JACOBY at
147-48.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Under the Branti rule, only those positions in which the hiring authority can
demonstrate that political affiliation is relevant to the efficient performance of the office will be subject to patronage dismissals. It follows, therefore, that the number of
positions available for political appointments, and thus the overall number of
patronage positions, will be substantially reduced. Presumably, the remaining positions either will be abolished or will fall under the general civil service and subject to
the restrictions of the Hatch Political Activity Act. See note 36 supra.
116. JACOBY at 161 (quoting F. MORSTEIN-MARX, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
(Eng. ed. 1957).
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